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Abstract—The video footage produced by the surveillance
cameras is an important evidence to support criminal investi-
gations. Video evidence can be sourced from public (trusted) as
well as private (untrusted) surveillance systems. This raises the
issue of establishing integrity and auditability for information
provided by the untrusted video sources. In this paper, we focus
on a airport ecosystem, where multiple entities with varying
levels of trust are involved in producing and exchanging video
surveillance information. We present a framework to ensure the
data integrity of the stored videos, allowing authorities to validate
whether video footage has not been tampered. Our proposal
uses a lightweight blockchain technology to store the video
metadata as blockchain transactions to support the validation
of video integrity. The proposed framework also ensures video
auditability and non-repudiation. Our evaluations show that the
overhead introduced by employing the blockchain to create and
query the transactions introduces a very minor latency of a few
milliseconds.
Index Terms—Blockchain, Surveillance Cameras, Data In-
tegrity, Airport.
I. INTRODUCTION
SURVEILLANCE cameras are increasingly being used forsafety, security, traffic monitoring and law enforcement
purposes. According to a recent report by tech site Compar-
iTech1, the world’s most surveilled city is Chongqing, China
where close to 2.5 million public CCTV cameras are installed.
The prevalence of these cameras is a result of advances in face
recognition technologies and admissibility of the video footage
as criminal evidence in court actions [1], [2], [3].
In Australia, the New South Wales (NSW) Police, has
voiced their support for widsepread deployment of surveillance
cameras for reducing crimes in the state [4]. Beside the state
owned public cameras, privately owned surveillance cameras
are also deployed in different places such as homes, shops,
malls and offices [5] to inhibit trespassers and reduce theft
and shoplifting. These privately operated cameras are an
important component of the surveillance ecosystem as often
their footage evidence is critical in the crime investigation
process [6]. However, the video streams of these privately
owned cameras are stored privately and only made available
to the law enforcement agencies on request. The latter have
to rely on watermarking and time stamping provided by the
device manufacturer for validating the stored video. There
1https://www.comparitech.com/vpn-privacy/the-worlds-most-surveilled-
cities/
is no guarantee that the obtained video stream has not been
digitally tampered with. The variability of these video sources
hence raises issues of information trust, authenticity and
integrity. This highlights the need for a technology solution
that can provide proof of integrity for video surveillance
information exchanged between devices operated by entities
with different levels of trust. In this paper, we focus on
one such representative environment, an airport ecosystem.
An airport consists of several different video surveillance
systems maintained and operated by different entities (airport
management, federal police, transportation service providers,
non-airline tenants, etc).
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Fig. 1. Airport security zones
Figure 1 presents a set of multiple security zones based
on their trustworthiness, namely trusted, semi-trusted and
untrusted zone, that typically exist in an airport. There are
multiple security cameras deployed by trusted entities such as
airport management, federal police, etc. Airport management
controls cameras installed to monitor the passenger areas, tar-
mac, apron and baggage handling operations while the trusted
zone managed by the department of homeland security/home
affairs encompasses federal police, customs, and immigration
etc. The untrusted zone is compromised of sources external
to the airport, mostly controlled by different agencies, such
as parking management, transport services operators (bus,
train etc). Next, there is the semi-trusted zone consisting of
entities located physically inside the airport such as service
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2providers, non-airline tenants (duty free shops, restaurants etc).
The notion of semi-trusted implies that these entities follow
certain security standards specified by the airport authorities.
The requirement of information trust and integrity is all
the more crucial in the airport environment, as the video
surveillance is used by government agencies to ensure public
safety and the evidence is critical to support counter-terrorism
investigations [7]. Due to the nature of the critical operations,
a mechanism is required to ensure trust in the data produced
by multiple sources in different trust zones. In this paper, we
explore the application of the blockchain technology to provide
the essential trust through integrity, non-repudiation as well as
auditability of video data in the airport environment.
Blockchain was initially proposed as a public ledger to
maintain Bitcoin transactions. However, many changes have
since been proposed in the blockchain structure, algorithms
and data models to make it suitable for use in different
application domains. These changes are required as the main
blockchain instances, such as Bitcoin [8], are focused on
digital currency. To fit into the video surveillance at airport
scenario, we require a lightweight blockchain framework that
is suitable for the resource constrained IoT environment and
introduces minimal latency in managing transactions. Out of
the available IoT based blockchain solutions, we employed
a framework called SpeedyChain [9], based on its unique
capability to allow appending multiple transactions in existing
blocks as opposed to traditional blockchains that requires to
combine transactions and thus create a block. In SpeedyChain
each device has its own block, and all transactions from that
device are stored in that block, thus considerably reducing
the transaction processing time. This lightweight blockchain
implementation runs at the gateway level and manages trans-
actions received from different sources.
We take a systems based approach and implemented a
prototype consisting of Raspberry Pi 3 devices streaming
several video data feeds to multiple gateways running as
virtual machines. Each gateway has an instance of Speedy-
Chain implementation tailored to support video transaction
management. We evaluated the suitability and effectiveness
of SpeedyChain as a technology solution to handle video
streams validation and integrity. Our evaluation results show
the efficacy of the proposed solution in being scalable, and that
it introduces negligible overhead as compared with traditional
video streaming solutions that do not rely on a blockchain
based solution. Additionally, we performed formal verification
of the protocol employed in the framework to validate its
correctness and reliability. We used Automated Validation of
Internet Security Protocol and Applications (AVISPA) [10] for
this purpose. This tool provides a proof of correctness for
secrecy of data and protection against the replay attacks related
to messages exchanged. The analyser assumes a Delov-Yao
intruder model and proved the validation protocol (presented
in Section III-D) as safe.
Our specific contributions in this paper are as follows:
• Propose a blockchain based framework to support verifi-
able video metadata management.
• System implementation and evaluation using the Rasp-
berry Pi 3 platform.
• Evaluation of the system’s scalability and the overhead
introduced.
• Security verification of the video validation protocol
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II
presents related works. In Section III, we provide the details
of our proposed framework. The framework evaluation and
results are presented in Section IV. Section V concludes the
paper and outlines the future work.
II. RELATED WORK
Current video forensics research aims to ensure the data
authenticity and integrity using different techniques and tech-
nologies [11], allowing the video (or part of it) to be used
to support court cases. Focusing on video integrity, some of
the evaluated methods rely on embedding watermarks and
inserting statistical information in the video itself. Mathai et
al. [12] propose a video forgery detection and localization
method based on statistical moment features and normalized
cross-correlation factor. The proposed video forgery detection
is focused on detecting duplicated content in a video sequence
using normalized cross-correlation. However, this solution
does not provide any proof of video integrity itself. Panwar
et al. [13] proposed a framework to provide sensor data
attestation through cryptographic functions enforcing a log-
sealing mechanism and producing immutable proofs used for
log verification. The framework ensures that sensor data and
log-sealed information could be stored in an untrusted storage
with the proposed attestation framework ensuring its integrity.
However, this framework relies on a trusted mechanism such
as Intel SGX to store the sealed information in a centralized
manner.
Prior works [8], [14], [15] have demonstrated the applicabil-
ity of blockchain technology in a broad range of domains in-
cluding finance, identity management and IoT security. Among
the various blockchain implementations Ethereum and Hyper-
ledger are widely considered to be suitable for a variety of
these applications. However, due to IoT specific characteristics
such as hardware limitations, Ethereum blockchain is a poor
fit as it generally uses the Proof of Work (PoW) consensus
algorithm [14]. The Hyperledger implementation, presents
limitation related to its scalability for IoT scenarios [15].
Due to these concerns, several researchers have proposed
blockchain tailored for dealing with IoT devices and their data.
Dorri et al. [16] proposed an optimized lightweight scalable
blockchain (LSB) for IoT aiming to handle security and
privacy aspects. This implementation is promising, however,
the transactions are distributed among blocks according to the
mining process. Similarly, IOTA blockchain was defined to
support IoT solutions by relying in the DAG data structure.
However, it still requires a coordinator before the transactions
are added to the DAG [17].
The use of blockchain to improve the reliability of video
evidence is explored in research by Kerr’s et al. [18]. The
authors propose a blockchain solution which uses a centralized
master node responsible for creating the blocks. Due to relying
on a master node, the blockchain does not require a consensus
algorithm. After creation, the block is sent to the camera,
3which is responsible for creating and embedding a watermark
consisting of a hash of the video streaming metadata. The
blockchain technology is also applied by Jeong et al. [19] for
mitigating the possibility of forgery of the video data. The
authors proposed an architecture that encrypts and stores the
video, creates a license within the blockchain, and exports
the video to an external storage solution. The decryption key
of the video is stored in a private database of the blockchain
node, which is responsible for the key management and access
control to the stored video. In comparison, our solution neither
modifies the raw video stream (by embedding a watermark
or by encryption) captured by the devices nor relies on any
centralised master node.
III. PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
In this section, we describe our proposed framework detail-
ing its components and their roles. The framework relies on
the blockchain technology, which ensures data integrity using
a hash algorithm to compute transactions and blocks informa-
tion. The framework provides auditability by maintaining all
the transactions processed through the framework for future
reference. In addition, the framework uses the PKI system by
associating each device with its public key. Any information
produced by a device and managed by the framework is thus
fully accounted, providing non-repudiation; a device cannot
deny being the originator of that data.
The proposed framework follows a three-layer architecture,
as shown in Figure 2. The entities present in the smart airport
scenario (responsible for producing, managing and storing the
video footage) are mapped to suitable layers. The surveillance
cameras are deployed in the sensing layer. The gateways in
the transportation layer manage the camera video streaming.
This layer has more resources than the devices deployed in
the sensing layer, hence is also responsible for maintaining the
blockchain and providing the proof for video integrity. Finally,
we have the storage layer where we can use any suitable
storage system. For this work, we use Interplanetary File
System Network (IPFS), a popular blockchain based storage
solution, for storing the surveillance videos.
Video
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Surveillance
Cameras
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Storage
Layer
Transportation
Layer
Sensing
Layer
Fig. 2. Conceptual multi layer architecture
A. Overview of SpeedyChain Blockchain
The gateways deployed in the transportation layer (Figure 2)
are responsible for maintaining the blockchain instance. The
blockchain is a distributed shared ledger, in which each
gateway maintain a local copy of the whole chain. In this
scenario, the gateway is responsible for computing the meta-
data (detailed in Section III-C) from the received video and
create a transaction.
The gateways in our framework are envisaged to support
multiple cameras, hence the deployed blockchain solution
should be lightweight (memory and processing requirements)
and capable of working in the IoT environment. Out of the
available IoT based blockchain solutions, we employed a
framework called SpeedyChain [9], based on its unique data
model that allows appending transactions in existing blocks
thus considerably reducing the transaction processing time.
BH1
BL1
B1 HashBH1
HashBHk 1SigGj Info1
BH2
BL2
BHk
BLk
HashBHk-1 k
NPKiTimek Polk
Expk
HashT1 2SigGj Info2
T1
T2
BLk
BHk
HashTm-1 mSigGj InfomTm
Fig. 3. Main components of SpeedyChain [20]
Figure 3 presents the SpeedyChain data model and its com-
ponents. Each block (Bk) is composed of two main sections,
block header (BHk), and block ledger (BLk), where k is the
block index. In this structure, each device (i) is mapped to a
specific block based on its public key (NPKi), which is stored
in the block header. Each block is linked with its parent by
computing the parent hash through a hash function represented
as H as follows
HashBHk-1 =
{
0 , when k = 1
H(BHk-1) , when k ≥ 2
The blockchain transactions (T) are nested under each
block header. All the transactions produced from a specific
device are stored in the block identified by its public key.
Each transaction, is composed by previous transactions hash
(HashTm-1), gateway (j) signature (SigGj), sequence number
(m), and information (Infot). The information field in each
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Fig. 4. Process for creation of transactions based on video metadata
transaction allows SpeedyChain to store different data types.
The transactions are linked with its ancestor following
HashTm-1 =
{
H(BHk) , when m = 1
H(Tm-1) , when m ≥ 2
SpeedyChain was initially proposed to be applied in smart
cities, which is a more generic scenario when compared with
an airport, hence several changes are required in the original
framework to handle the video integrity mechanism.
B. Device bootstrap process
In our framework, each device (camera) is allocated a sepa-
rate block (linked to the camera public key) in the blockchain,
where all the transactions of that camera are maintained.
The bootstrap process takes place when a new surveillance
camera is connected to the network. Before the streaming can
start, the camera needs to get authenticated with the gateway.
The authentication process involves identifying whether there
exists a camera block in the blockchain.
The block creation takes place when the gateway identify
that there is no existing block in the blockchain containing the
camera public key. The gateway requests the camera public
key (NPKi) to proceed with its block creation. Each camera
is uniquely identified by its public key present in the block
header (BHk). Additionally, the block header is populated
with the hash of the previous block header (HashBHk−1), its
index k in the blockchain, the block expiration time (Expk),
time when the block was create (Timek) and the access policy
(Polk) applicable to the device.
Once the block is created, the gateways run the PBFT con-
sensus protocol following the definition presented by Lunardi
et al. [20]. Only after the consensus is reached, the block
is inserted in the blockchain and the permissioned camera is
allowed to start the video streaming.
C. Video integrity protocol
Figure 4 presents the process of creating a transaction from
the surveillance camera. The solution is composed of three
main roles mapped to different layers as shown in Figure 2. At
the sensing layer, each surveillance camera produces the video
streaming which is transferred to the gateway. The gateways
are responsible for receiving the video streaming, processing
and forwarding it to the storage system. Initially, the gateway
validates the video source, only accepting video produced
from authenticated sources. In this context, as the blockchain
framework is permissioned, only cameras that have an exiting
block created in the blockchain are allowed to stream the video
to the IPFS network.
We explain the functionality of the gateways in several
steps:
1) Once the video chunks are received at the gateway,
it extracts the video metadata (VM) at regular time
intervals (m). The metadata is composed of the width
(Wi), height (He), frame rate (Fr), current position (Po)
indicated by time in milliseconds, and video hash (Vh)
of the chunk of video since last interval.
VMm = {Wi,He, Fr, Po, V h}
5The gateway next computes the metadata hash value
(HashVM) which is later used for ensuring the integrity
of the video.
HashVMm = H(VMm)
2) Once the gateway has calculated the HashVMm, the
video chunk is forwarded to the IPFS storage network.
Each new chunk that has been pushed into IPFS is
accessed by the address ADm that IPFS generate. This
address is required for future access to the video and for
validation purposes
3) The gateway can now proceed with creating a transac-
tion. The transaction is composed of the following fields;
previous hash transaction HashTm−1, the gateway sig-
nature SigGj , the transaction sequence number m, and
the information Infom.
Tm = {HashTm−1, SigGj ,m, Infom}
The transaction information field stores the file storage
address ADm (obtained in Step 2), the metadata hash
HashVMm (calculated in Step 1), and the timestamp
TTimem.
Infom = {ADm, HashVMm, TT imem}
4) This transaction is then pushed into the blockchain and
a block notification update is published to the peer
gateways, to keep the blockchain synchronized among
every gateway.
D. Video validation protocol
The validation process is triggered when any stored video
is required for investigation. The framework should provide a
means to prove that the retrieved video has not been tampered
with and identify the specific camera that has produced the
video. The querying process is initiated by an authorised entity
called Validator (VL). The VL is responsible for querying the
requested piece of video from the storage (ST) based on the
time and location parameters, and the video metadata hash
from the camera’s transactions stored in the gateways (GW).
When the corresponding transaction is found in the block
ledger, the framework compares the retrieved video metadata
hash with the stored transaction metadata hash HashVMm.
Figure 5 presents an hypothetical scenario where multiple
chunks of video are required to be validated. This typical
scenario involves gathering video feed from different cameras,
in a specific time duration, in order to follow the movement
of a suspect. Assume that based on the given time duration
in the query, the following video sequence is required to be
validated (shown with an arrow in Figure 5) [block BHb,
transaction T1], [BHc, T1], [BHd, T2], [BHd, T3], [BHc, T3],
[BHb, T4].
Fig. 5. Searching transactions based on camera and time duration
1) Protocol verification: Protocol verification is performed
to assess the security related to messages exchanged by the
protocol. As our framework does not involve multi-protocol
interactions and has very clear roles defined for the entities,
we selected AVISPA [10] instead of employing a rules-based
symbolic verifier such as Tamarin [21]. AVISPA tool uses High
Level Protocol Specification Language (HLPSL) to describe
the protocol security properties. It implements the Dolev-Yao
intruder model, which assumes that an intruder can control the
communication network.
The notation applied in the query protocol is presented as:
• VL: Validator
• ST: Storage
• GW: Gateway
• Kvl, Kvl−1: Public and Private key pair for VL
• Kst, Kst−1: Public and Private key pair for ST
• Kgw, Kgw−1: Public and Private key pair for GW
• ADm: Video chunk address
• V d: Video chunk
• Sci: Surveillance camera identified by i
• HashVMm: Hash computed from a video chuck meta-
data addressed by m
The query protocol consists of the communication between
the Validator (VL), Storage (ST) and Gateway (GW). This
operation is initiated by VL querying the video feed from the
ST, and querying the video hash metadata from the GW.
Step 1 : V L→ ST : ({V L.ST.(ADm)}.Kvl-1)Kst
Step 2 : V L← ST : ({ST.V L.(V d)}.Kst-1)Kvl
The VL requests the video feed identified by ADm to ST,
following the protocol described in steps 1 and 2. The ADm is
encrypted with the Kvl-1 along with the VL and ST identities;
additionally, the entire message is encrypted using ST’s public
key (Kst). The requested video is returned to the VL by ST .
The protocol encrypts the V d using the Kst-1, and the entire
message is encrypted using Kvl.
6Step 3 : V L→ GW : ({V L.GW.(Sci, TT imem)}.Kvl-1)Kgw
Step 4 : V L← GW : ({V L.GW.(HashVMm)}.Kgw-1)Kvl
Once the video is received from the storage, the VL requests
from GW the HashVMm, which represents the hash of the
video metadata stored in the blockchain at the time of its
creation (steps 3 and 4). The GW requires the Sci, which is
the surveillance camera information. This information is sent
from VL and is encrypted with the Kvl-1 along the parties
entities. The entire message is encrypted using the Kgw. The
GW data is sent to the VL encrypting the HahsVMm using
the Kgw-1.
Using the AVISPA tool, the protocol was evaluated, and
the results show that the exchanged data integrity was not
compromised. AVISPA result declared the protocol as safe,
which means a man-in-the-middle attack is not possible. An
intruder can retrieve the network traffic, however, due to
the asymmetric key combination applied in the protocol, the
intruder is not able to tamper the information exchanged.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We describe the performance evaluation of the proposed
solution to test the scalability and measure the overheads
introduced in creating, storing and managing these transactions
in the blockchain. Additionally, we evaluate the time spent
for the validation process i.e.,time spent in retrieving the
stored video, calculating the hash of metadata and querying
transactions stored in the blockchain for validation.
A. Experimental setup
The setup uses a video camera module connected to a
Raspberry Pi 3 board acting as the surveillance camera. It was
implemented as a multi-thread web service using the Flask
framework in Python 2.7, allowing the video feed streaming
to multiples clients. The SpeedyChain (implemented in Python
2.7.10) and the video streaming functions (using OpenCV
4.4.1) are deployed in gateways operating at the transportation
layer.
We deployed four gateways, each running Linux Server
Ubuntu 18.04 in a virtual machine with 2GB of RAM, 1
processor and 10GB of the disk.
The video produced by each camera is stored in the IPFS
(version 0.4.21) configured to run in a private mode (which
only allows connections from pre-defined clients). IPFS was
deployed in two virtual machines running Linux Server
Ubuntu 18.04, each VM with 4Gb of RAM, 2 processors and
20Gb of the disk.
Figure 2 illustrates how the various solution elements are
logically distributed while Figure 4 introduces the interaction
among different components to produce the transactions.
B. Evaluation
In an airport scenario, a large number of surveillance cam-
eras are in operation and each gateway has to handle multiple
live streams from these cameras. The first experiment that we
ran aims to evaluate the scalability of the framework when
the number of cameras managed by each of the 4 gateways
are increased from 1 to 32. The length of the video recorded
at the gateway level was of 30 minutes, which was split in
small video chunks each of duration 10 seconds to generate
180 transactions for each surveillance camera. This experiment
measures the overheard created at a gateway, for assembly and
creation of a new transaction containing the video metadata.
The results shown are the average across the four gateways
operating in different virtual machines.
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Fig. 6. Time to create a video metadata transaction
Figure 6 presents the results plotting the average processing
time against varying number of cameras producing video
streaming. The y-axis represents the average processing time
to create a new transaction from the metadata information
extracted from the video chunk and push it into the blockchain.
The graph shows that the average processing time is almost
constant when the number of cameras are increased to 8 per
gateway, and higher processing times are observed when more
than 16 cameras are introduced per gateway. The increase in
the processing time beyond 8 cameras per gateway can be
attributed to the limited hardware resources assigned to each of
the virtual machine (1 processor and 2 GB of RAM) emulating
an IoT gateway. The gateway was also running multiple OS
processes to manage multiple connected cameras.
Please note that the processing time here includes all the 4
steps highlighted in the video record protocol (Section III-C).
However, as compared with a traditional system with no
integrity ensuring mechanism, the real penalty only involves
the step 1, where we calculate the hash of the metadata. The
stream is immediately pushed to the IPFS in step 2. Steps 3
and 4 can be considered offline in a way that they do not
effect the overall latency of a real time monitoring system.
Moreover, even in the worst case scenario where we have 32
cameras per gateway and we consider latency of all 4 steps,
the total latency introduced is only about 8 milliseconds.
In the second set of experiments, we evaluated the time
required for the gateways to update their local copy after
7receiving notification of a new transaction from one of its
peer. This involves steps of validation and insertion of the
new transaction in their local chain. In this scenario, we
used four surveillance cameras connected to a single gateway.
Each camera produced video streaming over a period of 12
hours. The gateway was responsible for creating a total of
4320 transactions per camera with the total transactions equal
to 17280. Figure 7 presents the time taken by the gateway
and shows that the time increases as more transactions are
being added. Note that all transactions from a single camera
are being added to the same block, and that SpeedyChain is
utilising a linear linked list as the data structure for keeping
track of the transactions. Hence, a transaction with a higher
sequence numbers takes more time to be inserted in the block,
explaining the observed behaviour in Figure 7. The results
also show some deviations as the gateway is running multiple
processes at the same time, e.g., operating system functions,
multiple cameras connections. In the worst case, the gateway
takes less than 0.8 milliseconds to append 4 transactions in 4
different blocks at end position of 4320.
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The last set of experiment focus on the validation process
covering the time to retrieve transactions from the blockchain
and compare the metadata with the video stored in the IPFS.
We highlight that in this evaluation the time to retrieve the
video chunk from IPFS is not considered, as it depends on
the the network latency and the performance of IPFS.
For this scenario, the block length was composed of 4320
transactions produced from the surveillance cameras. Figure 8
presents the time required to query transactions for different
video chunks. The searched transactions are located in differ-
ent positions in the block, varying from position 16 to 4096.
The results show that the time to query a transaction depends
on the position of the transaction in the block, presenting an
exponential growth of the query time. The reason for this
behaviour can again be ascribed to the use of linked list in
the SpeedyChain implementation that incurs a search penalty
based on the position of the searched transaction (sequential
search) in the block. In the worst case when the searched
transaction is stored at the end of a block, the total validation
time is about 3.1 millisecond.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we employed a lightweight blockchain in-
stance, to propose a framework that can provide integrity,
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
16 32 64 128 256 512 1024 2048 4096
Ti
m
e 
in
 m
illi
se
co
nd
s
Transaction Number
Fig. 8. Time to validate a video chunk
auditability and non-repudiation security properties related to
surveillance videos. We focused on the use case scenario of
an airport where the surveillance videos from multiple sources
can be combined to form evidence for criminal investigations.
We have taken a systems based approach and developed a
proof of concept by using Raspberry Pi acting as surveillance
cameras, gateways implemented as virtual machines and IPFS
as the storage solution. Performance evaluation results show
that our framework introduces minimal latency in creating
and validating transaction in the blockchain. This work has
demonstrated the viability of blockchain technology to provide
a trust building mechanism in stored video. Our system imple-
mentation also provides insight regarding the requirement for
IoT gateway hardware to handle multiple surveillance cameras
producing real time video streaming.
As future work, we plan to improve the performance
of the proposed framework by using optimised algorithms
for insertion and querying the transactions in a blockchain.
Moreover, the current implementation only allocates a single
block per device for storing all the transactions. As shown
by the evaluation results, the performance degrades when a
large number of transactions are inserted in a single block.
For supporting continuous video streaming, we are exploring
the use of multiple blocks per device in order to further reduce
the transaction insertion and query time.
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